ideology, mass killing and armed conflict
My primary research is on the role of ideology in forms of political violence - especially 'mass killings' and 'atrocity crimes' such as genocides, war crimes and campaigns of state terror.
The role of ideology is one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary research on mass killings. Some scholars (particularly within the field of genocide studies) present ideologies as crucial, providing extremist goals and hatreds that can motivate perpetrators to kill civilian groups. But many other scholars (particularly in the field of conflict studies) are more sceptical, contending that perpetrators of mass killing rarely seem ideologically committed, and that rational self-interest or powerful forms of social pressure are more important drivers of violence than ideology.
My work challenges, though also draws on, both these perspectives. I advance what I term a 'neo-ideological' perspective on mass killing, in which ideology is indeed an essential foundation for such violence, but does not primarily function through extremist goals or hatreds. Instead, I emphasise the way ideology shapes perceptions of 'security politics,' and stress that deep ideological commitments and hatreds are not the only or even primary way in which ideology is linked to violence. I argue that collective violence depends on an underlying 'ideological infrastructure' that generates, sustains and coordinates violent actions through a range of different causal mechanisms - many of which do not depend on deep belief.
The role of ideology is one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary research on mass killings. Some scholars (particularly within the field of genocide studies) present ideologies as crucial, providing extremist goals and hatreds that can motivate perpetrators to kill civilian groups. But many other scholars (particularly in the field of conflict studies) are more sceptical, contending that perpetrators of mass killing rarely seem ideologically committed, and that rational self-interest or powerful forms of social pressure are more important drivers of violence than ideology.
My work challenges, though also draws on, both these perspectives. I advance what I term a 'neo-ideological' perspective on mass killing, in which ideology is indeed an essential foundation for such violence, but does not primarily function through extremist goals or hatreds. Instead, I emphasise the way ideology shapes perceptions of 'security politics,' and stress that deep ideological commitments and hatreds are not the only or even primary way in which ideology is linked to violence. I argue that collective violence depends on an underlying 'ideological infrastructure' that generates, sustains and coordinates violent actions through a range of different causal mechanisms - many of which do not depend on deep belief.
I develop this argument in detail in my recent book: Ideology and Mass Killing: The Radicalized Security Politics of Genocides and Deadly Atrocities, which was published by Oxford University Press in June 2022. The book represents the first volume to offer a dedicated, comparative theory of ideology’s role in mass killing, substantiated through four case studies: i) Stalinist Repression in the Soviet Union between 1930 and 1938, ii) the Allied Bombing Campaign against Germany and Japan in World War II from 1940 to 1945, iii) mass atrocities in the Guatemalan Civil War between 1978 and 1983, and iv) the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. It draws on a range of disciplines - including genocide studies, conflict studies, International Relations, political theory, political sociology, intellectual history, social and political psychology, and social epistemology - and offers new ways to think, not only about ideology and mass killing, but ideology's role in politics and violence in general.
This reflects my interest in ideology's role in international politics more broadly. Alongside Mark L. Haas, I am co-editing the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Ideology and International Relations, due to be released in late 2022, which brings together thirty three leading scholars of ideology, across twenty six chapters, offering cutting edge accounts of ideology's relevance to a broad range of issues, states and regions in world politics. I have also conducted a major survey of empirical research on ideology's effects on armed conflict - for an annotated bibliography of major works, click here. That survey underpinned my more substantive article on 'Ideology and Armed Conflict', which was a runner-up for the award for the best article in the Journal of Peace Research in 2019.
This reflects my interest in ideology's role in international politics more broadly. Alongside Mark L. Haas, I am co-editing the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Ideology and International Relations, due to be released in late 2022, which brings together thirty three leading scholars of ideology, across twenty six chapters, offering cutting edge accounts of ideology's relevance to a broad range of issues, states and regions in world politics. I have also conducted a major survey of empirical research on ideology's effects on armed conflict - for an annotated bibliography of major works, click here. That survey underpinned my more substantive article on 'Ideology and Armed Conflict', which was a runner-up for the award for the best article in the Journal of Peace Research in 2019.
theorising ideology and the causes of ideological change
Alongside my research on the role of ideology in political violence, armed conflict and mass killing, I am more broadly concerned with the study of ideology in political theory, intellectual history and social sciences. All my work on ideology draws on a highly interdisciplinary theoretical background, and there is no field in which this is more necessary that the theorisation of ideological change. A range of disciplines have each contributed major insights to our thinking about this process, which lies at the heart of politics, yet holistic, integrative understandings are almost non-existent. My work, in tandem with others, argues that this must change - and that a more effective understanding of ideological change must integrate, in particular, both psychological accounts of why individuals attach themselves to particular ideologies and more sociological accounts (though including work in political theory and communication studies) of key social processes driving significant changes in the ideological environment of a society.
Much of my work on this topic has been in collaboration with members of the Ideological Conflict Project at the Waterloo Institute of Complexity and Innovation and Balsillie School of International Affairs of the University of Waterloo. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon and Professor Paul Thagard for their direction of that project. Much of this work is now continuing at the Cascade Institute of Royal Roads University, British Columbia, Canada (click on link to find out more about the institute).
Much of my work on this topic has been in collaboration with members of the Ideological Conflict Project at the Waterloo Institute of Complexity and Innovation and Balsillie School of International Affairs of the University of Waterloo. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon and Professor Paul Thagard for their direction of that project. Much of this work is now continuing at the Cascade Institute of Royal Roads University, British Columbia, Canada (click on link to find out more about the institute).